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INTRODUCTION: 
 
Central to our analysis here is a critical reinterpretation of the pervasive conservative 'common 
sense' regarding inequality and the social exclusion of substantial sections of contemporary working 
class youth, and concerning crime and disorder.  We begin by engaging with three core components 
structuring and sustaining this social exclusion of youth: the ideology of the 'broken society'; the 
variety of anti-social 'contracts' and compliance processes to which many marginalised young people 
have become subject; and the failing state with which they frequently have to deal.  We question 
each of these components of neo-liberal political ideology and especially the way in which they 
combine to blame the victims of failing neo-liberal governance for a wide range of social problems, 
utilising their ascribed culpability to justify tougher compliance measures, sanctions, disciplines and 
punishments.  In contrast we argue that it has been the pursuit of neo-liberal free market policies 
which have exacerbated contemporary inequalities while fostering a powerful ideology of 
individualism that has generated the precarious situation of marginalised youth as collateral harm. 
Our argument presents the claim that, as neo-liberalism fails youth, so it too fails as governance.  Yet 
states do not fail, overnight, or even all at once; a failing state can still be strong and dangerous. But 
the more that states fail to achieve certain minima of human rights and social provisions, the more 
they slip down the 'quality of life' league tables, then the less they reflect a collective public interest, 
the less legitimacy they possess and the more broken the social and cultural contract upon which 
they depend. 
 
The Broken Society ? 
 
The 'broken society' discourse played a key role in the re-working of  Conservative Party strategies 
for welfare reform, family policy, youth 'disaffection' and crime control (Cameron, 2008a; Driver, 
2009).  According to Mooney (2009), the notion of a 'broken society', echoing the moralistic tone of 
the 'broken windows' analysis on crime and community decline (Wilson and Kelling, 1982) which 
came to dominate crime prevention thinking in the final decades of the 20th century, initially 
appeared to suggest a different way of understanding of social problems in contemporary Britain.  
However, as Mooney concluded, this view was 'largely underpinned by an individualistic and 
moralistic view of poor people as a distinctive group apart from ‘mainstream’ society... and a thinly 
disguised culture of poverty argument that people experiencing poverty are lacking in the capacity 
to escape poverty, gripped by fatalism and apathy' (Mooney, 2009: 447).  In turn, such attitudes 
were said to fuel crime, anti-social behaviour and youthful violence and disorder. In its totality, the 
'broken society' argument was not a million miles from the 'underclass ' discourse which had worked 
its pernicious effects in the 1990s (Murray, 1990) even though this idea, imported from the USA, had 
never been supported by reliable evidence in the UK context (Smith, 1992; Morris and Irwin, 1992; 
MacDonald, 1997). 
 
Characteristic of neo-liberal politics, the emerging 'broken society' commentary blamed individuals 
for social problems (Finlayson, 2010) and was implicit in much of the output of Iain Duncan Smith's 
Centre for Social Justice policy think tank.  The Centre's influential report Dying to Belong (CSJ, 2009) 
which underpinned several strands of Cameron Conservative public policy - on gangs and youth 
violence, on families and social responsibility - famously inverted the widely accepted  relationship 
between cause and consequence when it described a youthful generation being lost  'as they 
plunged through violence and criminality to hopelessness and despair' (CSJ, 2009: 9).  Britain’s gang 
culture was said to be the product of such environments, often to be found in the country's most 
deprived and marginalised communities.  And just as the causes are laid at the feet of feckless or 
irresponsible individuals, so, according to Bauman (2008), neoliberal politics encourages individuals 
to find their own 'individual solutions to socially generated problems, and to do it individually, using 
their own skills and individually possessed assets'.  In turn, he noted, this tended to put people in 
competition with one another, making communal solidarity seem ‘irrelevant if not downright 
counter-productive’ (Bauman, 2008).1 
 
If individuals had to solve their own problems by hard work and a strong dose of social 
responsibility, it is then but a short step to the idea that 'dysfunctional' or broken families might be 
'turned around' by appropriate intervention (Kirby, 2009).  This, of course is precisely the aim of the 
Troubled Families programme (Bond-Taylor, 2014), a punitive form of social welfare (Phoenix, 2009) 
closely aligned with crime and disorder management, which, as Hancock and Mooney have argued, 
performs the routine but 'increasingly pervasive' surveillance and intervention 'to regulate and 
control working class lives and communities' (Hancock and Mooney, 2013).  Accordingly, under the 
Conservative-led Coalition Government of 2010-15, welfare reform became increasingly 
characterised by conditionality and benefit sanctions, measures which eventually meshed with the 
Troubled Families programme and a corresponding array of anti-social behaviour measures thereby 
establishing a wide-ranging regime of compliance management interventions, the 'soft end' of the 
spectrum of social controls described by Bell (Bell, 2015). 
 
Welfare, Conditionality and Sanctions 
 
When, in Punishing the Poor (2009), Loic Wacquant described similar regime changes, from 'welfare' 
to 'workfare', in the USA, he outlined a process whereby the benevolent 'left-hand' of the state 
withdrew, and the more punitive 'right hand' extended, replacing social supports with social 
controls.  In the UK, by contrast, perhaps especially in England and Wales, it is difficult to describe so 
abrupt a transformation, notwithstanding the austerity driven expenditure cuts underpinning the 
'Welfare Reform' agenda.  For although significant aspects of the welfare reform programme appear 
primarily intended to demonstrate a lowering of the cost of the benefit system to the notional 'tax-
payer', it remains the case that substantial sums are still being invested in social support, although 
the purpose of this support is no longer to meet 'liveability' needs, but rather to incentivise, cajole 
                                                          
1  The contrast here between neo-liberalism's individualist perspective and that advocated by C. Wright Mills in 
The Sociological Imagination (1959) can hardly be more profound.  In 1959 Mills had argued that the essential 
role of the social scientist was to 'translate private troubles into public issues'.  Neo-liberalism's fragmentary 
vision, by contrast, seeks to turn social problems into personal responsibilities - or, in some cases, no-one's 
responsibility, just  personal misfortunes. 
and coerce people into employment. Universal Credit, Iain Duncan Smith's comprehensive new 
welfare support system and the Work Programme, which replaced the former 'jobseekers 
allowance', became compulsory for all unemployed benefit claimants over 25 who had been out of 
work for a year (9 months for those aged 18-24).  Claimants are referred to government selected 
service providers, the majority being private companies, tasked with helping the unemployed back 
into work. Formal agreements (we turn to consider these 'quasi-contracts' later in our discussion) or 
'claimant commitments' are drawn up outlining the support and services offered to the unemployed 
and the obligations of claimants spelled out. The service providers, like the agencies involved in the 
Troubled Families programme, are paid according to the results they achieve, sustained job 
placements. Evaluation of the programme by the National Audit office in 2014 revealed that over 2 
million claimants were expected to have been referred to the programme by March 2016, at a cost 
of £2.8 billion (NAO: 2014). Roughly one in four of those referred were finding employment 
(although only 11% of those deemed 'harder to help'), but the target threshold implied only moving 
"into employment lasting six months or longer" (NAO, 2014: 4).  Six months hardly constitutes 
secure and stable employment, especially for the lower-skilled sectors in which a majority of 
placements were being achieved. Savings of £41 million were reported by the NAO compared with 
"similar levels of performance on previous welfare-to-work programmes", but a loss of £11 million 
was reported (anticipated to rise to £25 million) relating to payments made to contractors for non-
validated employment placements (that is, payments for employment placements not achieved).  
Concluding its 2014 Review, the NAO noted overall:   
 
It is not yet clear that the Work Programme has substantially improved on past performance or met 
its other aims for helping people into work. In particular the Department has struggled to improve 
outcomes for harder-to-help groups. Contrary to the intentions of the Work Programme, contractors 
are spending less on people in these groups and there are signs that some people receive very little 
support. The Work Programme is also not working as the Department intended in the way it rewards 
contractors for performance. Flaws in contracts and performance measures have led to unnecessary 
and avoidable costs (NAO, Summary 2014: 8). 
 
The reference to the outcomes for 'harder to help' groups is tellingly complemented by a discussion 
of the 'parking' of these 'difficult' groups - effectively, the warehousing of the unemployable.  Similar 
issues have been identified in earlier 'welfare-to-work' programmes, and in other reports on the 
Work Programme (Work and Pensions Select Committee, 2013) but alongside the Programme's lack 
of effective support for needy people and perverse incentives for contractors to claim payments for 
services not delivered, the evidence clearly suggests a policy intended to discipline and disentitle 
those excluded from the labour market rather than meet their needs. 
Similar issues arise in respect of the 'benefit sanction' processes, the complementary compliance 
control systems intended to 'responsibilise' claimants and reduce the length of time that people 
spend in receipt of welfare benefits.  Beatty et al. (2015) have reviewed the toughened regime of 
benefit sanctions installed after 2012 by the Welfare Reform Act of that year.  They note that not 
only were the length and severity of benefit sanctions increased, but there has also been a 
significant step change in the frequency with which they are applied, for example the number of JSA 
sanctions applied almost tripled from a rate of 2.5 per 100 claims to 7.1 per 100 in 2014.  The 
monthly average number of Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) sanctions rose from 35,500 a month prior to 
October 2012 to a monthly average of 84,800 after this date. Likewise there was a three-fold 
increase in Employment Support Allowance (ESA) sanctions from 1,400 per month in March 2013 to 
5,400 in March 2014.  While the key rationale for the sanction system concerned the need to change 
claimant behaviour in order to reduce unemployment, Beatty et al., suggested there is 'no robust 
evidence to support this claim' (Beatty et al., 2015) leading to questions being asked regarding both 
the fairness and effectiveness of the benefit sanctions. Overall, Beatty et al., concluded that rather 
than benefit sanctions fostering a culture change amongst claimant groups they in fact often have 
counter-productive effects, piling additional hardships upon the already most vulnerable, further 
excluding those facing the greatest barriers to mainstream employment opportunities.  
During the first few months of 2015 Frances Ryan produced a series of compelling reports in the 
Guardian newspaper detailing sixty suicides under investigation by the DWP where it was thought 
that a benefit sanction decision had been the immediate trigger to the claimant killing him or herself 
(Ryan, 2015a). A month later, following an Inquest suicide verdict on another claimant, a Jobcentre 
advisor described the 'constant and aggressive' pressure she was placed under by management to 
meet performance targets 'almost by persecuting people' (Ryan, 2015b; O'Hara, 2015). Later in the 
year, the aggressive culture of benefit conditionality and sanctioning  were exposed by a battery of 
FoI requests revealing that over 80 people a month were dying after being declared 'fit for work'.  In 
total, 2,380 people died between December 2011 and February 2014, shortly after being declared fit 
for work and rejected for sickness and disability benefits or Employment Support Allowance.  A 
further 7,200 claimants died after being awarded ESA and having been placed in the work related 
activity category in order to be prepared for a return to work (Ryan, 2015c). 
Such evidence of the pressure placed upon claimants reflects the broad conclusions reached by 
Griggs and Evans who acknowledged that there was a substantial 'gulf between the rhetoric and the 
evidence for the effects of sanctions in welfare reform. The gulf is not just on evidence, but also in 
different approaches to preventing poverty and promoting opportunity' (Griggs and Evans, 2010).  
UK Governments have committed themselves both to evidence-based policy making and eliminating 
child poverty by supporting 'hard-working families' (although often invoking the unfortunate 
language of 'strivers and skivers' when doing so).  Yet, as Griggs and Evans conclude, there is still 
rather limited evaluation of the real consequences of benefit sanctions in practice, 'policy-makers 
continue to justify extending sanction-backed conditionality on moral grounds while taking an 
ambivalent attitude to the evidence' (Griggs and Evans, 2010: 7). The available qualitative evidence 
tends to suggest that, while sanctions might induce labour market compliance, they have relatively 
little effect upon underlying motivations to work (Ibid.). 
A substantial body of international econometric evidence, some of which is reviewed by Griggs and 
Evans (2010), points to benefit sanctions having some impact upon a narrow range of labour market 
behaviours, such as reducing the duration of periods of unemployment and raising employment 
participation rates. Such initiatives, however, are usually only evaluated in the short term and often 
allow few conclusions about the quality, durability or sustainability of the work placements 
achieved.  Many such largely econometric evaluations also fail to take account of a range of social 
factors such as the institutionalisation and recycling of poorer quality employment opportunities 
(unstable jobs and lower pay), the reproduction of long term family poverty, poorer outcomes for 
children, poorer health and damaging consequences for especially disadvantaged groups; few 
studies go on to explore the wider crimogenic consequences of benefit sanctions.   
 
Arriving at such troubling conclusions about the Work Programme, welfare conditionality and 
benefit sanctions, the 'soft controls' and compliance measures of austerity, brings us back to the 
core paradox of 'broken society' 'common-sense'.  It will be recalled that the central concerns of the 
'broken society' argument, first articulated in the original Centre for Social Justice Breakdown Britain 
report of 2006 included family breakdown, educational failure, worklessness and economic 
dependence, addictions and indebtedness (CSJ, 2006).  The underlying similarities between these so-
called 'pathways into poverty' (rather than consequences of poverty) and Charles Murray's 
underclass thesis from a decade and a half earlier are striking.  More to the point, with family 
poverty, the institutionalisation of long term social disadvantage and poorer outcomes for children 
shown to be a direct consequence of greater welfare conditionality and benefit sanctions, it 
becomes difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Government's tough 'broken society' compliance 
measures reproduce the very broken society (fragmenting relationships, fractured communities, 
social exclusions and especially marginalised and demonised youth) that they claim to be addressing. 
They appear to be the measures least likely to produce the ‘stable two-parent family life’ seen by the 
government as vital in mending Broken Britain and thereby reducing levels of long term poverty. 
The related case of indebtedness, a parallel world of compliance, individualisation and 
responsibilisation, is also instructive.  For aside from the social and opportunity costs associated with 
the Conservative-led Coalition's high profile decision to increase student loans and abolish 
educational maintenance allowances, the longer term picture reveals 'a steady and problematic 
increase in personal debt in the UK' over the last two decades (Ben-Galim & Lanning, 2010).  Almost 
two thirds of people on annual incomes below £10,000 exhibit 'problematic levels of indebtedness' 
(Walker et al., 2015).  Furthermore, debt is especially problematic for families in relative poverty.  
Research for the CAB has shown that debt clients were typically poor, 'with a high proportion of 
people in receipt of means tested benefits' (Edwards, 2003).  Walker has noted that 'for a growing 
number of people, personal debt supplements their existence in a relatively low wage and insecure 
employment landscape' (Walker, 2011: 526). Despite this, the largely unregulated pay-day loan and 
'personal debt industry' exercises its own disciplinary compliance, confirming, often physically 
reinforcing, a sense of individual responsibility for poverty and perceived financial mismanagement.  
And, just as the compliance processes within systems of benefit sanctioning serve mainly to 
institutionalise inequality and social exclusion so, likewise, it is hardly in the interests of the debt 
industry to either abolish debt or to allow debtors to escape (Walker et al., 2015).   
As Levitas has argued (2012: 12), reviewing the impact of a range of government policies, the 
cumulative impact has been rising unemployment and increasingly precarious temporary and low-
waged employment, reductions and restrictions in benefits and, in particular, an assault on the living 
standards of families with children'.  This is the contrived policy context in which families encounter 
'difficulties' and 'troubles'.  Furthermore, the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) predicted in 2012 that, 
as a consequence of recent government policies, the numbers of children living in households in 
absolute poverty would grow and those in relative poverty would increase after 2013 (Joyce, 2012). 
Yet despite this broader policy context, as Bond-Taylor has noted, 'concerns about criminality and 
ASB' rather than poverty and disadvantage came increasingly to shape the emerging governmental 
agenda (2014: 143).   
 
This is certainly not the first time that problems of poverty, inequality and disadvantage have been 
refracted through the moralising language of 'desert', culpability and irresponsible lifestyle choices, 
on the contrary there is a long history of this stretching back into the early 19th century and beyond.  
And as Golding and Middleton astutely noted, over thirty years ago, the British have long 
exemplified a difficulty in distinguishing poverty from crime (Golding and Middleton, 1982).  Both 
the Prime Minister and his Chancellor of the Exchequer have appeared prone to the same errors.  In 
2013, following the prosecution of a man who had killed six of his own children in an incompetent 
attempted arson compensation case, George Osborne claimed that Mick Philpott 'embodied 
everything that was wrong with the welfare state' and questioned the purpose of 'subsidising 
lifestyles like that' (Dolan and Bentley, 2013).  A few years earlier, David Cameron had been equally 
scathing of 'welfare lifestyles' following the sentencing of two people for a contrived 'kidnap' scam.  
Cameron argued, his comments drawn straight from the Breakthrough Britain phrasebook, that the 
case was a: 
 
'damning verdict of our broken society... a family held together by drink, drugs and deception... An 
estate where decency fights a losing battle against degradation and despair. ...Children suffer[ing] at 
the very sharpest end of our broken society ... all over the country are other young  victims,  too.  
Children  whose  toys  are  dad’s  discarded  drink  bottles; whose role models are criminals, liars and 
layabouts; whose innocence is lost before their first milk tooth. What chance for these children? Raised 
without manners,  morals  or  a  decent  education,  they’re  caught  up  in  the  same destructive chain 
as their parents. It’s a chain that links unemployment, family breakdown, debt, drugs and crime. (David 
Cameron, 2008b, quoted in Mooney, 2010) 
 
This criminalised conception of the disadvantaged - especially poor families and their marginalised 
young people - is the necessary precursor to the new systems of (anti-social) contractual governance 
embodied in our contemporary measures for 'Troubled Families' interventions, youth employment 
and training, and the youth justice and anti-social behaviour management practices to which we 
now turn. 
 
Anti-social contracts ? 
 
We propose to discuss the various areas of policy mentioned above within a single frame, that of 
anti-social contracts. The case for doing so should become clear as the argument develops.  In the 
first place, each of the four policy areas impinges directly or indirectly upon the problematic 
question of marginalised youth. As Ferguson convincingly demonstrates, since the 1970s each 
recession has had an increasingly worse impact upon young people, while each recovery benefitted 
them less; likewise policies have directly discriminated against them with 16-24 year olds excluded 
from the 'national living wage' and the denial of automatic housing benefit to those aged 18-21 
(Ferguson, 2016). In the second place, as Guy Standing has noted, 'youth make up the core of the 
precariat' (Standing, 2011: 66).  He describes three such 'precarity traps', although he rather 
overlooks a fourth.  His first precarity trap relates to disadvantaged, broken and dysfunctional family 
backgrounds; the second involves the loss of positive masculine role models, including ambition, 
access to networks or what used to be called the 'work ethic'; and the third, partly a consequence of 
the last, concerns the drift into peripheral non-economic (or illegitimate economic) roles including 
addiction, apathy and gangs where alternative kinds of role model might be found.  Standing 
describes gang membership, disaffection and petty criminality as 'part of the wider precarity trap for 
young men' (Standing, 2011).  Hallsworth and Lea have referred to this as a kind of 'self-
warehousing', (2011: 22), the internalisation of a sense of failure and responsibility, the most abject 
forms of which are reflected in the escalating suicide and para-suicide rates amongst young, 
economically marginal, males (Ellison, 2014).  The final precarity trap rather overlooked by Standing 
concerns criminalisation itself and the impact of criminal convictions and periods of imprisonment 
upon subsequent career opportunities and future employability. 
 
This infamous NEET generation, caught in a fractured transition between family dependence and full 
labour market involvement and economic independence, is increasingly engaged by attitudinal, 
behavioural and especially criminal justice, interventions preoccupied by risks, riots and 
radicalisation.  Increasingly surveillance and control, and governance through crime and disorder 
management are presented as logical and rational responses to the problems of marginalised youth. 
In each of the areas addressed, the governance of youth goes beyond the compliance management 
described already and instead takes on a profoundly anti-social and frequently counter-productive 
contractual form where behaviour is closely regulated, responsibility is fixed in a rigid one-
dimensional fashion and significant consequences follow breaches of the contract. 
 
Contractual principles run throughout the Troubled Families and Anti-Social behaviour interventions, 
most conspicuously so in the varieties of Acceptable Behaviour Contract designed to nip 'offensive 
and disorderly' behaviour of younger children in the bud, but which do so by potentially jeopardising 
the social housing tenancies of the families involved (Stephen & Squires, 2004).  Similarly, 
contractual aspects form part of the system of police 'final warnings' in that young people have to 
agree the offence of which they are accused and also consent to undertake such activities as form 
part of the final warning programme.  Essentially similar arrangements underpin the Referral Order, 
first introduced in 2002, and available to Youth Courts in the case of offenders aged 10-17 who are 
in court charged with an offence for the first time.  As the Ministry of Justice Referral Order (RO) 
guidance stipulates, the young offender must admit the offence with which they are charged and 
then 'under the order the young offender agrees a contract with the [referral] panel which can 
include reparation or restitution to their victim, for example, repairing any damage caused or making 
financial recompense, as well as undertaking a programme of interventions and activities to address 
their offending behaviour' (Ministry of Justice, 2015).   
 
As we have noted earlier, (Squires and Stephen, 2005: 100-102), the contractual elements of these 
orders, forms part of a wider strategy of 'responsibilisation governance' derived from a conception 
of the contractual balance between rights and duties which is frequently invoked in contemporary 
public policy, especially crime and disorder management.  Yet while some commentators have 
criticised ROs for the way in which they attempt to graft an artificial notion of restorative justice 
onto what is actually an enforcement process (Haines, 2000), our main concern about this order has 
concerned the doubtful kind of contract upon which it is based. While presented as consensual, the 
RO is actually based upon compulsion (an order made by the Youth Court) and a major imbalance of 
power between young people and an alliance of enforcement interests (youth justice workers, 
community representatives, referral panel members, the police and victims); for instance, from the 
outset, young people were not allowed any legal representation when before the panels to discuss 
the contents of their 'contracts' (Wonnacott, 1999).  As was argued when the ROs were first 
introduced, such arrangements could give rise to de facto 'institutionalised bullying' (Wedd, 2000), 
while other commentators questioned the compatibility of the RO procedures with existing 
international principles of youth justice (Goldson, 2000).  And in our own research, despite receiving 
assurances about how ‘contracts’ and agreements were very carefully compiled in full discussion 
with young people themselves, we continued to find examples of young people who either couldn’t 
remember the compliance requirements of their own contracts, or didn’t actually understand what 
they meant (Squires and Stephen, 2005).  There might also be something ethically doubtful about 
requiring a young person aged 10-12 to commit to a contract, they would not be considered 
legitimate in many other areas of social life. 
 
Contractual principles, the balancing of duties and responsibilities, are implicit in many of the 'two-
step injunction' processes (Simester & Von Hirsch, 2006) which, following the Anti-Social Behaviour, 
Crime and Policing Act 2014, characterise the powers intended to regulate a wide array of criminal 
and 'pre-criminal' behaviours.  For example, drawing upon the former ASBO 'on conviction', 
generally referred to as the CrASBO, the new (post 2014) criminal behaviour order, imposed 
following conviction for a criminal offence might include any number of prohibitive conditions 
(avoiding any associating with certain people, staying away from certain places or activities and 
maybe keeping curfew hours), or treatment conditions, such as attending designated drug and 
alcohol treatment services.  As Simester has argued, such orders entail a principle of 'two-step 
criminalisation', a first step attaches the conditions to a specifically targeted subset of persons, the 
second step applies enhanced or up-tariff penalties (Simester & Von Hirsch 2006).  Similar 
considerations apply to the Gang Injunctions sometimes referred to as Gang-bos introduced in 2011.  
They are targeted at young people at risk of being drawn into gang activity but the focus is upon 
preventing violence, attached conditions can involve behaviour change requirements and mentoring 
but also certain prohibitions (people, places).  Gang injunctions can be awarded according to the 
lower, 'civil law' burden of proof, the balance of probabilities, and hearsay evidence can be heard in 
support of an application. 
 
The public space protection order extends the 'first step' principle even wider and can impose 
behavioural conditions on anyone using the designated area.  No prior convictions are required and 
the behaviour which is regulated comprises that which is 'unreasonable' rather than illegal although 
'likely to have, a detrimental effect on the quality of life of others in the locality' (Home Office, 
2014).  This suggests that the PSPO falls squarely into the sphere of 'pre-criminal regulation', 
reiterating the sense of 'institutional mistrust' experienced by marginalised young men over recent 
years (Brown, 1998; Kelly, 2003).  Breach of a PSPO is a criminal offence which can be punishable by 
a £100 fixed penalty notice or a fine.  Amongst a number of critics, Liberty have argued that the 
PSPO is too vaguely drawn and open-ended while the grounds for appeal are especially narrow.  
Furthermore, the penalties for breach can be issued by either the police or by certain designated 
local authority officials (Liberty, 2015). There seems every indication that the 'usual suspects', 
especially marginalised young men, will continue to be at the focus of the new legislation, just as 
they were in respect of preceding ASB powers (Bottoms, 2006; Bannister and Kearns, 2012). 
 
In sum, a pervasive sense of distrust, sustained in part by de-civilising and criminalising discourses of 
youth (France, 2007) have perpetuated a sense that youth itself, or at least that visible, urban, 
segment of it, is somehow deemed 'anti-social' by nature and that extraordinary measures, what 
Ferguson, drawing upon Habermas, refers to as 'juridification processes' - 'when actions or 
behaviours become subjects of statute law as part of a wider trend towards extending the reach of 
the law into the domains of the lifeworld' (Ferguson, 2016: 195) - are considered necessary.  These 
extraordinary measures, which become even more markedly unjust and anti-social when the young 
people in question are deemed to be members of a gang - for which some of the most oppressive 
police powers and punitive forms of racist surveillance and 'dragnet justice' are reserved (Bridges, 
2013; Williams and Clarke, 2016) - are themselves divisive, unfair and profoundly anti-social.  Squires 
originally floated a concept of 'anti-social policy' in 1990, it was centred upon the apparent 
consequences of 'the privatisation of the economy, the domestication of social care and the 
centralisation of political authority... the retrenchment of civil liberties while advanc[ing] the power 
of private property, defending the privileges of rank and reasserting the merits of inequality, 
patriarchy and nationalism' (Squires, 1990: 2).   
 
In particular, the argument continued, 'policies which have widened inequalities and exacerbated 
social tensions, restricted rights to welfare, increased the numbers suffering poverty or 
homelessness, or undermined the aspirations of many whilst leading even more people to suspect 
that their overall quality of life is declining, might well merit the label 'anti-social' (Ibid., 2).  Rolling 
forwards nearly three decades and it appears that for many young people the essential contract 
relationship at the heart of social citizenship, of belonging, has been shattered.  This suggests a 
broken contract rather than a 'broken society'2.  Young people are variously described as 
'disaffected', 'disconnected', 'excluded', 'non-participating' or 'marginalised' although the language is 
often ambiguous, inconsistent or simply wrong.  Sometimes it is a question of what young people 
are connected to, rather than simple 'disconnection' - for instance, it should be recalled that the 
Centre for Social Justice Report was titled Dying to Belong (CSJ, 2009).  The primary concern involved 
what they did belong to - supposedly gangs - rather than their complete isolation. And, in place of 
the wider social contract, expressed in an idea of citizenship, young people, as we have seen, are 
increasingly confronted by a formidable array of disciplinary - behaviour, compliance and 
performance - contracts, some specifically tailored to the needs of individuals, others more generic 
in nature, some designed for designated groups, but all deploying sanctions, penalties and exclusions 
as a consequence of breach or non-performance.  But of all the anti-social and quasi-contracts 
gaining comment and attention in recent years, few have attracted more attention than zero-hours 
contracts. 
 
                                                          
2   This may not be the only broken 'contract' discussed in similar terms, for, following evidence of the numbers 
of former military personnel, either in prison, suffering PTSD or related psychological conditions, or homeless, 
a number of commentators have voiced concerns about the 'Armed Forces Covenant' (Gillan and Norton-
Taylor, 2007).  The Ministry of Defence re-issued the covenant in 2011. 
To begin with, however, it is important to acknowledge that, zero-hours contracts are certainly not 
confined exclusively to young people, but that said, young people certainly feature significantly 
amongst the most insecure, temporary and poorly paid sections of the labour market.3 A survey 
commissioned by the trade union Unite suggested that, across the country, 5.5 million people were 
subject to zero-hours contracts, most of them young people.  Thirty-six per cent of those on the 
contracts said they were not entitled to holiday pay and over three quarters received no sick pay 
(Butler, 2014).  While supporters emphasise the flexibility such contracts offer to employers with 
fluctuating work patterns (such as seasonal work) and even facilitating choices for some employees 
about when and how much to work, Len McCluskey, General Secretary of Unite, described zero 
hours contracts  as 'a growing scandal... creating a sub-class of insecure and low-paid employment' 
(cited in Butler, 2014).  While the benefits of labour market flexibility, traded off against job security 
and workforce sustainability makes a certain kind of narrow, econometric, business sense, 
facilitating the effective management of risk, reducing the costs of recruitment and training, and 
even, for some less scrupulous employers, as a means of avoiding particular employment 
obligations, the day to day operation of zero-hours contracts, tells a different story.  This involves a 
picture of employees living permanently as if 'on-call', reluctant to turn down work for fear it may 
not be offered again (being 'zeroed down'), while attempting to juggle the flexible incomes from 
flexible working with the largely inflexible demands of housing costs, running a home, caring for 
children and synchronising access to tax credits and other income benefits (Pennycook et al, 2013; 
Adams and Deakin, 2014).  
 
Yet while there is plenty of econometric research on zero hours contracts, there appears relatively 
little empirical sociological research into the anti-social and exclusionary consequences of shifting 
employees onto zero-hours contracts. Notwithstanding this, employment commentators have 
drawn attention to the break, signified by zero-hours contracts, with an inclusive Keynesian social 
contract which, as Levitas has argued, understood social inclusion as a form of social citizenship, an 
aspect of labour market participation (Levitas, 1996).  By contrast, according to Elliott (2013) zero 
hours contracts re-establish a precarious 'reserve army' of low-waged, low skilled and low 
opportunity, temporary, labour.  As Elliott notes, these are precisely the kinds of conditions that the 
union movement as a whole sought to overcome.  In place of an idea of working associated with 
respect and aspiration (Sennett, 2004), a standard of living and the dignity of labour, notions barely 
grasped by barren contemporary management discourses on the 'work-life balance', zero hours 
contracts establish anti-social, coercive and exploitative, performance and compliance systems that 
detract from a sense of belonging, reinforce social divisions and exclusions, and which resemble, in 
all relevant respects, the wider regime of anti-social contracts impinging upon the lives of the 
youngest and poorest.  This is especially the case with evidence emerging that, in an effort to put 
further pressure on jobseekers and fill notified vacancies, Job Centre staff were able to 'sanction' 
benefit claimants (under the new universal credit system) if they did not apply for and show 
willingness to accept certain zero-hours jobs (Mason, 2014), despite concerns that such work could 
disrupt training and apprenticeship opportunities, tying young workers into permanent insecure and 
low paid employment.  As we have indicated, it is not so much 'society' which is broken, but rather 
the bond between important sections of the population and the state.  And at this point we turn to 
the final aspect of our argument. 
 
Conclusion:  The failing state? 
                                                          
3  An early legal discussion of zero hours contracts, from 2002, concluded 'there is no doubt that the 
casual/zero hours worker personifies precarious work and that many such workers are amongst the worst 
treated in the labour market' (Leighton, 2002: 77), and adding, 'such one-sided working relationships are 
unusual in other EU states... there is often some incredulity on the part of lawyers... that such a working 
relationship can be legally valid' (ibid., 72). 
 
 
Any discussion of 'state failure' will inevitably beg important questions, rooted in political theory and 
philosophy, about the various roles and purposes of states; what they seek to achieve, and the 
discourses of rights and well-being with which they surround themselves.  So how might we argue 
that 21st century neo-liberalism is failing the poorest, neglecting a marginalised generation of 
working class youth, rolling back their expectations and aspirations of social mobility and equal 
opportunity and condemning them to a lifetime of precarious, dissatisfying, low-waged employment 
with only impoverished social provision in the event of unemployment, ill-health and eventual 
retirement: from cut-price cradle to early grave.  
 
Another means by which to assess state performance might be to draw upon a more comparative 
approach, judging the performance of states against a group of similar nations, 'European partners', 
OECD nations, or something similar.  Of course, in the wake of BREXIT, it may well be said that 
Britain has declared itself rather less interested in such comparisons.  Even so, the exceptional work 
of Wilkinson and Picket, in The Spirit Level (2010) provides a compelling portrait of the relations 
between inequality and a range of social problems (from mental disorders, crimes, infant mortality 
rates and poor health), but it is the comparative regime analysis developed by Pantazis and 
Pemberton (2009) which gives us a direct purchase on the question of state performance.  Pantazis 
and Pemberton's work feeds directly into the discussion of anti-social policies and failing states, for 
their concern is with differing kinds of state and policy regime and the production of social harms.  
Like Wacquant (2009), they recognise that socio-economic outcomes such as mass incarceration, 
widening patterns of inequality and the increasingly marginal status of many young, working class, 
men, is not an inevitable outcome of inexorable social and economic forces but the result of clear 
political decisions.  Their article then proceeds to itemise the greater or lesser harms associated with 
social democratic, corporatist and neo-liberal state regimes.  They then proceed to match these 
regime types to a range of policy outcomes data from the WHO, UNICEF, ILO and the OECD, relating 
to a series of social, material and psychological needs such as:  basic physical health, infant and neo-
natal mortality, life expectancy, education and literacy, economic activity, 'personal autonomy', 
housing, material and environmental deprivation, social and political participation, as well as 
security, 'autonomy' and 'recognition' (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009).   
 
The conclusions they draw from this international survey centre upon the consistently poor 
performance of the neo-liberal regime type, which, they say, appears to assume that 'the benefits 
accrued through economic growth outweigh the inequalities that are inherent in this form of [state] 
organisation' (2009: 231).  They note that while some 'may benefit from the freeing of the market, a 
series of collateral harms result which far outweigh those occurring in other regimes.'  The UK, in 
particular, they note, is also 'marked by high levels of economic insecurity, reflected in the 
persistence and extent of relative poverty and inequality' (2009: 232).  In a similar vein, the UNICEF 
child welfare 'Report Card' for 2013 placed the UK 16th (out of 29) 'affluent countries', but 
significantly below virtually all other western European societies, on a series of 5 measures of well-
being: material well-being, health and safety, education, behaviours and risk, and housing and 
environment, with the UK ranking especially lowly on educational opportunity, behaviours and risks 
and health and safety. 
 
Translating these figures into the very specific example of violence victimisation, Danny Dorling, 
supported by Bellis et al's (2011) research on Accident and Emergency hospital admissions, has 
made a strong empirical case that inequality and deprivation are powerful drivers of violent 
victimisation (Dorling, 2005).  Marginalised young men living in 'deprived areas' are over three times 
more likely to access A&E services following a violent assault.4  Drilling even further into these 
                                                          
4 Furthermore, following the introduction of A&E police reporting protocols involving gang-related and 
weapon violence, there are strong grounds for thinking that gang-involved young people are especially 
disproportionate violence figures, ONS data for the period 2011-2013 shows that, even as overall 
homicide rates have fallen, young black men are four and a half times more likely to be victims of 
homicide than young whites (ONS, 2014).  As Dorling has concluded, murder rates, are increasingly 
concentrated in the poorest areas. Murder (and interpersonal violence) has become significantly 
concentrated in the poorest and most deprived parts of Britain (Shaw, Tunstall and Dorling, 2005).  
And as Dorling emphatically concludes 'murders are at the tip of the pyramid of social harm and 
their changing numbers and distributions provide one of the key clues as to where harm is most and 
least distributed' (Dorling, 2005: 40).  In effect, even this least 'ideological' and most 'intimately' 
individual of crimes, undoubtedly the most terminal of criminal harms, can be seen to reveal the 
profound influence of social forces, and political choices.  In turn these choices are shaped by 
priorities, reflecting contrasting political ideologies, which have allowed the growth of inequality, 
tolerated the existence of poverty, whilst driving the social exclusion and disentitlement to which 
the marginalised young and least qualified have been subject.   
 
At the same time, as Dorling has noted, there appears something in the British outlook that accepts, 
as natural, the pattern of social inequalities and the harmful injuries of class associated with it.  Even 
as the rift between the richest and the poorest began to stretch still wider following the political 
changes of the 1980s, overhauling the principles of collectivism and universalism that had sustained 
key features of what was once the 'welfare state', so an even more virulent and vituperative series 
of attitudes towards the poor and marginal has taken hold, deriding the poor for their 'failure' and 
condemning the young as violent, 'chavs' and 'scum' (Tyler, 2008; 2013; Hayward and Yar, 2006; 
Pickard, 2014).  The irony that the principal victims of the 'broken society' are blamed for its 
condition represent just one further aspect of this British paradox. 
 
Yet violent victimisation is only part of our story.  The 'broken society' analysis with which we began 
this discussion is not just a question which concerns the simple distribution of harms and 
victimisation, it has also concerned, as David Cameron, quoted earlier, demonstrated, the 
organisation of a power to stigmatise, criminalise, ostracise and punish.  This is the power to produce 
a criminality against which society's moral and juridical forces might be deployed, to demonstrate 
once and for all the feckless and irresponsible condition of the poor and their need for discipline, 
supported by compliance processes, sanctions and punishment.  To take our commentary full circle 
we have chosen to conclude by referring briefly to the excellent IPPR study, Make me a Criminal 
(Margo and Stevens, 2008).  Drawing upon cross-European evidence of diminished social provisions 
and falling quality of life indicators for young people, the authors demonstrate conclusively the 
precarious and overwhelmingly crimogenic contexts in which marginalised young people in the UK 
are forced to live. Cumulatively, the withdrawal of social supports, the rates of educational exclusion 
and underachievement, the disrupted family backgrounds, the collapse of the youth and young adult 
labour markets and the transition and training opportunities that went with them, and, not least, the 
hostile ideological climate they face in many areas of life have detached and disaffected a 
generation.  In turn, the strategies they adopt - street socialisation, nuisance behaviours, substance 
misuse, peer group activities and gang formation - 'delinquent solutions' all over again (Downes, 
1966) - are further demonised, regulated and criminalised.  In sum, the anti-social governance of 
contemporary marginalised youth invariably produces and reproduces the very problems it 
bemoans; this is not a broken society, more a failure of government. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
reluctant to visit A&E where the injuries they have sustained are not thought to be serious or life-threatening, 
see Squires (2011). 
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